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In its October 2011 Term, the Supreme Court decided two cases—
Maples v. Thomas
1
 and Martinez v. Ryan
2
—that have a significant 
impact on the provision of counsel in state postconviction proceedings.  
Typically, a prisoner must litigate federal law challenges to his 
conviction first in state court before bringing them to federal court.
3
  
Missteps in the litigation of state court claims, such as missing deadlines 
in state court or failing to raise claims there, can bar a prisoner from 
litigating those claims later in federal habeas, a doctrine known as 
“procedural default.”
4
  In Maples and Martinez the Court expanded the 
 
 Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  Thanks to Chris Lasch for 
helping to shape my thinking on both state postconviction and the effects of AEDPA, and for his 
contributions to our article Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue, which forms the starting point 
of my argument here.  Chris also provided thoughtful feedback on an earlier draft of this article, 
particularly about the relationship between AEDPA and Teague anti-retroactivity doctrine.  Thanks 
too to Ty Alper, Eric Freedman, and Lee Kovarsky for providing helpful comments, and to Ty and 
Eric for sharing manuscripts of their own forthcoming essays on these cases. 
 1.  132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). 
 2.  132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 3.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (“This Court has long held that a state 
prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has not exhausted available 
state remedies as to any of his federal claims.”). 
 4.  Id. at 729 (“This Court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court 
if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question 
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circumstances in which deficient performance by state postconviction 
counsel can overcome procedural default, to permit the prisoner to 
litigate defaulted claims on the merits in federal habeas.  Others have 
ably described how those cases represent an important expansion of 
access to counsel in state postconviction.
5
  My aim in this short 
Symposium contribution is to argue that, given the increased 
significance of state postconviction under the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
6
 Maples and Martinez could 
have a salutary effect on the development of the federal constitutional 
criminal procedure litigated in those proceedings. 
At a minimum, Maples and Martinez reflect concern that individual 
litigants receive adequate representation to ensure that their federal law 
claims have a day in court.  Indeed, the two cases have been hailed by 
Professor Lee Kovarsky as “Gideon for state postconviction.”
7
  Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Maples includes what Justice Scalia 
describes as a “lengthy indictment of Alabama’s general procedures for 
providing representation to capital defendants,”
8
 noting that Alabama is 
“nearly alone among the states” in failing to “guarantee representation to 
 
and adequate to support the judgment.”). 
 5.  See, e.g., Lee Kovarsky, Maples and Martinez: Gideon for State Postconviction, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 2, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/10/maples-v-
thomas-and-martinez-v-ryan-gideon-in-the-state-post-conviction-era.html; Ty Alper, Towards a 
Right to Litigate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. __ (forthcoming May 
2013) (arguing that the Martinez rule will be much more useful for capital defendants who are 
routinely appointed counsel in federal habeas; “for non-capital defendants who have no counsel in 
federal court, there will be no federal habeas claims to default in the first place”); Eric M. 
Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction Proceedings After 
Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2013); Nancy J. King, Preview: A 
Preliminary Survey of Issues Raised by Martinez v. Ryan, in LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed.), 2012-13 Supplement (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147164; Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial 
Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2203391 (predicting that the next area of 
litigation will be the adequacy of state procedures for raising ineffective assistance claims).  See 
also Hugh Mundy, Rid of Habeas Corpus? How Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Has Endangered 
Access to the Writ of Habeas Corpus and What the Supreme Court Can Do in Maples and Martinez 
to Restore It, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 187 (2011) (“the decisions in both cases promise to have 
a lasting effect on access to habeas relief.”); Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed 
Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right 
to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1279 (2012) (“In the past year, 
the Supreme Court has signaled a receptivity to providing equitable relief from procedural default 
strictures based on ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.”). 
 6.  Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 to 2254 (2006)). 
 7.  Kovarsky, supra note 5. 
 8.  Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 934 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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indigent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings.”
9
 
As Chris Lasch and I have explained elsewhere,
10
 after AEDPA, 
state postconviction is the best opportunity for certain federal law claims 
to be litigated, the vehicle that will provide lower courts, and ultimately 
the Supreme Court, with the most unfettered opportunity to decide open 
questions in federal constitutional criminal procedure.
11
  This is because 
AEDPA erects many procedural obstacles to merits review of state 
prisoners’ federal habeas claims,
12
 including a standard for winning 
merits relief that essentially precludes federal courts from resolving open 
constitutional questions in federal habeas.
13
  Justices of the Supreme 
Court have acknowledged the increasing importance of state 
postconviction in the post-AEDPA world.  In her dissent in Lawrence v. 
Florida,
14
 Justice Ginsburg wrote, “since AEDPA . . . our consideration 
of state habeas petitions has become more pressing.”
15
 
I argue in this paper that, because Maples and Martinez coincide 
with other important developments that make state postconviction more 
important, they could have critical synergistic effects.  Maples and 
Martinez create incentive for states to provide effective counsel in state 
postconviction at a moment when these proceedings are being forced to 
assume a new role in the development of federal constitutional criminal 
procedure.
16
  The confluence of these events could produce a new era in 
 
 9.  Id. at 918 (majority opinion).  Although Justice Alito joined the Court’s opinion, he wrote 
a separate concurrence to voice his view that Mr. Maples’ situation was the product of a “perfect 
storm of misfortune,” and not the fault of the State of Alabama’s system of appointed counsel.  Id. 
at 928-29 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 10.  Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The 
Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2008). 
 11.  Id. at 228, 236 (describing how AEPDA “freezes the development of doctrine by 
forbidding lower courts from relying on and developing Supreme Court teaching,” and how “state 
prisoners’ certiorari petitions seeking review of direct appeals and state postconviction decisions 
will present increasingly important opportunities for the Court to develop its criminal constitutional 
doctrine.”). 
 12.  See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal 
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 806 (2009) (“AEDPA restricted habeas by creating a series of new 
procedural obstacles: a first-ever time limit for filing a first habeas petition; stricter barriers to 
review of second and successive petitions; and a new, tougher standard of review that precludes 
habeas courts from granting relief unless the state court’s prior decision was ‘contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law’ as declared by the Court.”). 
 13.  Shay & Lasch, supra note 10, at 228, 236. 
 14.  549 U.S. 327 (2007). 
 15.  Id. at 343 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 16.  Some commentators have even suggested that federal habeas review has become so 
meaningless after AEDPA that it should be drastically restricted and the resources redirected to 
support the provision of counsel in state proceedings.  See JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN & NANCY J. KING, 
HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 
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state postconviction. 
I.  SOME BACKGROUND 
A. No Right to Counsel=No Claim for IAC=No “Cause” to Overcome 
Procedural Default 
In order to understand the significance of Maples and Martinez it is 
first necessary to know that the Supreme Court decided in the late 1980s 
that there is no federal constitutional right to the appointment of counsel 
in state postconviction.
17
  Following from that, the Court concluded in 
Coleman v. Thompson
18
 in 1991 that there was no federal constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel in state postconviction: no 
right to counsel, ergo, no right to the effective assistance of counsel.
19
  
(Although Coleman did leave open an important question about state 
postconviction proceedings that are the first opportunity to raise claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
20
 as we shall see in Martinez).
21
 
This has important implications for state prisoners’ ability to bring 
federal constitutional claims in federal habeas.  For state prisoners 
seeking federal habeas relief, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is a major means of overcoming procedural default in state court.  The 
Supreme Court said in Wainwright v. Sykes
22
 that state prisoners must 
 
87-107 (2011) (arguing that in non-capital state prisoners’ cases, federal habeas review should be 
available only for new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure made retroactive and for 
claims of actual innocence); Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in 
State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791 (2009).  But see Lee Kovarsky, Habeas Verite, 
47 TULSA L. REV. 13, 18 (2011) (discussing and taking issue with Hoffmann and King’s 
recommendation to reform federal habeas).  In this paper, I take no position on that issue, focusing 
instead on the apparent trends in the Supreme Court’s decisions. 
 17.  Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Murray v. Giarrantano, 492 U.S. 1 
(1989).  But see Eric Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital 
Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1089 (2006) (arguing that “[c]ontrary to 
much loose talk, Giarratano did not decide that there is no right to counsel in state postconviction 
proceedings in capital cases.  Rather, Giarratano only rejected the claim of constitutional 
entitlement in that particular instance, and implicitly held that other facts would lead to other 
results.”). 
 18.  501 U.S. 722 (1991) 
 19.  Id. at 752 (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings.  Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel in such proceedings.”). 
 20.  501 U.S. at 722.  See also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1314 (2012) (“whether a 
prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”) 
 21.  See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 22.  433 U.S. 72, (1977). 
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demonstrate “cause-and-prejudice” to overcome a procedural default,
23
 
and ineffective assistance of counsel meets that standard.
24
  With 
Coleman’s bar on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in state 
postconviction proceedings, state prisoners were left without an 
important means of overcoming defaults in state postconviction to obtain 
review on the merits of federal claims in federal habeas. 
Maples and Martinez provide avenues for state prisoners to bring 
their federal claims arising from state postconviction in federal habeas.  
Maples identifies an end-run around the Coleman conundrum in extreme 
circumstances by expanding on the notion of “abandonment” by counsel.  
If counsel “abandoned” the client, the procedural misstep cannot be 
attributed to the client.  Martinez stops short of declaring a federal 
constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in state postconviction, 
but it does offer a systemic “fix.”  It provides that, when state 
postconviction is the first opportunity for a state prisoner to litigate a 
claim, states will not be able to assert procedural default when they fail 
to appoint state postconviction counsel or that lawyer is ineffective.  
This creates incentives for states to appoint competent counsel in state 
postconviction matters, which is why Lee Kovarsky described these 
cases as “Gideon for state postconviction.”
25
 
B.  A New Role for State Courts After AEDPA Restricts Federal 
Habeas 
The second important thing to understand in order to appreciate the 
significance of Maples and Martinez is that, after the passage of 
AEDPA, state courts have an increasingly important role to play in the 
development of federal constitutional criminal procedure.  AEDPA 
restricts the circumstances in which federal courts may grant habeas 
relief to state prisoners.
26
  For example, it provides in part that a federal 
court cannot grant a state prisoner’s habeas merely because the state 
court was wrong about the federal law.  Rather, in order to merit federal 
 
 23.  Id. at 88-90. 
 24.  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (“So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose 
performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. 
Washington, we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in 
a procedural default.”) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). 
 25.  Kovarsky, supra note 5. 
 26.  See generally, JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 343 (6th ed. 2011); Kovarsky, supra note 16, at 17 (summarizing AEDPA 
provisions).  But see  Nancy J. King, Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 29 
(2012) (discussing implications of Lafler for federal habeas review of state court judgments under 
AEDPA). 
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habeas relief, the state court’s adjudication of the claim must have 
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,”
27
 or was based on an 
“unreasonable determination of the facts.”
28
  Justice Kennedy has 




As Chris Lasch and I explained in our 2008 article, Initiating a New 
Constitutional Dialogue, this provision heightens the importance of state 
proceedings as vehicles for litigating federal constitutional claims.
30
  
After AEDPA, in most circumstances, state court proceedings are the 
only vehicle through which state prisoners will receive unfettered review 
of the federal constitutional claims.
31
  In a state prisoner’s federal habeas 
case, the Court is not able to resolve conflicts or develop the law, just 
correct decisions that are “contrary to or an unreasonable application of 
clearly established Federal law.”
32
  As a result of AEDPA, the Supreme 
Court typically (with some exceptions) can decide open federal law 
questions in state prisoners’ cases only when it grants certiorari from the 
judgment of a state court.
33
 
For example, in Carey v. Musladin,
34
 which Chris and I discussed 
in our article,
35
 a California prisoner challenged his murder conviction in 
federal habeas, claiming that buttons worn by spectators depicting the 
murder victim deprived him of a fair trial.
36
  The Ninth Circuit granted 
Musladin federal habeas relief,
37
 extending Supreme Court doctrine 
 
 27.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
 28.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 
 29.  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784, 786 (2011) (concluding that “where a state 
court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be 
met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”). 
 30.  Shay & Lasch, supra note 10, at 215. 
 31.  There are some exceptions, such as when a prisoner raised the federal law claim in state 
court, but the state court did not decide it on the merits.  See, e.g., Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 
(2009) (“Because the Tennessee courts did not reach the merits of Cone’s Brady claim, federal 
habeas review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies under AEDPA to ‘any claim that 
was adjudicated on the merits in State Court proceedings.’”).  But see Johnson v. Williams, ___S. 
Ct.___, 2013 WL 610199 at *7 (2013) (concluding that “[w]hen a state court rejects a federal claim 
without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim 
was adjudicated on the merits,” although that presumption sometimes can be rebutted). 
 32.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 33.  Shay & Lasch, supra note 10, at 215. 
 34.  549 U.S. 70 (2006). 
 35.  Shay & Lasch, supra note 10, at 225. 
 36.  Musladin, 549 U.S. at 73. 
 37.  Id. 
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concerning courtroom conduct by state actors to cases involving 
courtroom spectators.
38
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed.
39
  Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in Musladin, pointed 
out that the Court had not yet addressed whether spectator conduct could 
create the “inherent prejudice” necessary to constitute a due process 
violation.
40
  Despite the fact that “lower courts ha[d] diverged widely” 
on the issue, the Court did not decide this open question.
41
  Because 
Musladin’s case was in federal habeas, the Court explained, under 
AEDPA, all the Ninth Circuit should have considered was whether the 
California court’s decision affirming his conviction was “contrary to or 
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”
42
  If 
Musladin’s case had come up from state proceedings, however, the High 
Court could have resolved the issue regarding spectator conduct, 
providing guidance to the lower courts.
43
 
In a more recent case, Renico v. Lett,
44
 a Michigan state prisoner 
challenged his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that it 
violated double jeopardy.
45
  The defendant claimed that the trial court 
should not have declared a mistrial at his first trial, because there was no 
“manifest necessity” to do so as required by Supreme Court 
precedents.
46
  As a result, he asserted, his conviction at his second trial 
violated double jeopardy.
47
  The Michigan Court of Appeals initially 
accepted this claim, but the Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the 
conviction, despite the fact that the appellate prosecutor had confessed 
error.
48
  The Supreme Court, in a decision by Chief Justice Roberts, 
 
 38.  Id. at 75. 
 39.  Id. at 74. 
 40.  Id. at 76. 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id. at 77. 
 43.  Of course, even if new rules of constitutional criminal procedure are announced in cases 
in which the Supreme Court grants certiorari from state postconviction proceedings, they may not 
have retroactive effect in jurisdictions that are bound by or that follow federal anti-retroactivity 
doctrine under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  See Chaidez v. United States, ___ S. Ct. ___, 
2013 WL 610201 (2013) (concluding in the context of a federal prisoner’s coram nobis petition that 
the rule announced in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), did not apply retroactively to 
prisoners whose convictions were final when Padilla was decided).  But see Danforth v. Minnesota, 
552 U.S. 264 (2008) (concluding that state courts are not constrained by Teague because Teague 
was designed to address the comity concerns present in federal habeas review of state prisoners’ 
convictions). 
 44.  130 S. Ct. 1855 (2010). 
 45.  Id. at 1860-61. 
 46.  Id. at 1861. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 1861, 1865 n.3. 
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rejected Mr. Lett’s claim, explaining that, since the case was in federal 
habeas, the issue was not whether the decision of the Michigan state 
courts “was right or wrong,”
49
 but that the only question was whether the 
state court decision reinstating Mr. Lett’s conviction was clearly 
unreasonable.
50
  If Lett’s case had gone to the U.S. Supreme Court on 
certiorari from Michigan state courts, the Supreme Court would not have 
had to apply this “deferential” AEDPA standard.
51
 
An exchange between the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
2007 case Lawrence v. Florida,
52
 acknowledges the increasing 
importance of certiorari grants from state postconviction.  In Lawrence, 
the Court considered whether the tolling provision of the one-year 
AEDPA statute of limitations for state prisoners’ federal habeas 
petitions, which stops the clock while “an application for state 
postconviction or other collateral review . . . is pending,”
53
 included the 
time for filing certiorari petitions from state postconviction proceedings.  
In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Thomas, the Court concluded that 
the statute of limitations was not tolled during this period.
54
  The habeas 
petitioner had argued that failing to include the period of time for 
seeking certiorari from state postconviction in the AEDPA tolling 
provision would create procedural complications, including the filing of 
protective federal habeas petitions.
55
  The Lawrence majority rejected 
this argument, reasoning that its decision would cause “few practical 
problems.”
56
  In support of its conclusion, it cited Justice Stevens’ 
concurrence in Kyles v. Whitley,
57
 a pre-AEDPA opinion which had 
noted that the Court seldom granted review from state postconviction 
proceedings, waiting instead to consider state prisoners’ federal claims 
on certiorari from federal habeas.
58
 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg countered, “[t]he majority regards the 
practical problems [with this conclusion] as inconsequential for we 
rarely grant certiorari in state habeas proceedings.”
59
  However, she 
noted that Kyles was a pre-AEDPA decision.
60
  She explained that 
 
 49.  Id. at 1865 n.3. 
 50.  Id. at 1866. 
 51.  Id. at 1860.  
 52.  549 U.S. 327 (2007). 
 53.  Id. at 331-32; 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2) (West 2013). 
 54.  Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 329. 
 55.  Id. at 334. 
 56.  Id. at 335. 
 57.  Id. at 335 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 58.  Id. (quoting Kyles, 498 U.S. at 932 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 59.  Id. at 342 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 60.  Id. 
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AEDPA had changed the certiorari calculus, and that, “since 




There is another reason why state postconviction proceedings are 
increasingly important after AEDPA.  Professor Lee Kovarsky, in a very 
lucid pre-decision post regarding Maples and Martinez, pointed out that 
the Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster
62
 the preceding term limits 
federal habeas courts reviewing claims “adjudicated on the merits in 
State court proceedings” to considering the facts as developed in state 
postconviction.
63
  Professor Kovarsky concludes that after Cullen, “the 
state habeas proceeding is now the ball game.”
64
  Thus, state 
postconviction is doubly important: cutting-edge federal constitutional 
claims can be resolved only on certiorari from state proceedings,
65
 and a 
federal habeas court’s determination of whether a state court decision is 




Against this backdrop, Maples and Martinez focus renewed 
attention on the role of counsel in state postconviction matters.  Maples 
emphasizes the need for adequate counsel in these important 
proceedings, and Martinez creates powerful incentives for the states to 
appoint state postconviction lawyers and to ensure that they have the 
resources and skills to provide effective representation. 
II. THE CASES 
A.  Maples v. Thomas 
Maples represents the development of the doctrine of 
“abandonment” by counsel to permit a state postconviction client to 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (“We now hold that review under § 
2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 
merits.”). 
 63.  Kovarsky, supra note 5. 
 64.  Id.  See also Freedman, supra note 5, at 102, 108 (describing how the result in Martinez, 
when combined with “pressure created” by Cullen v. Pinholster, might create a situation in which 
states “decide that their only reasonable choice is to provide effective counsel for every indigent 
capital petitioner pursuing state postconviction relief.”  Freedman explains: “If the states create 
robust processes for post-conviction review the federal courts will under Pinholster treat their 
individual outcomes with greater respect than before.  But if the states fail to do so they are now 
vulnerable not only to structural assaults for failing to provide due process but also to case-specific 
challenges based on the equitable rule of Martinez.”). 
 65.  Lasch & Shay, supra note 10. 
 66.  Kovarsky, supra note 5. 
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overcome procedural default in federal habeas.
67
  Cory Maples was a 
convicted Alabama prisoner sentenced to death.
68
  Because Alabama 
does not provide appointed counsel on state postconviction, he was 
represented in that proceeding by pro bono attorneys from a New York 
firm, Sullivan & Cromwell.
69
  Those attorneys were working with local 
counsel who had moved their admission pro hac vice.
70
 
During the time that Mr. Maples’ case was in state postconviction 
proceedings, his pro bono attorneys left their firm.
71
  Regrettably, they 
failed to notify their client, the court, or their local counsel.
72
  No one 
from their firm sought to substitute as counsel for Mr. Maples.
73
  As a 
result, when the Alabama postconviction court denied Mr. Maples’ 
petition, it sent a notice addressed to the two departed attorneys to the 
New York office of Sullivan & Cromwell.
74
  The New York firm 
returned that notice unopened to the Alabama clerk’s office marked 
“returned to sender,”
75
 and the court clerk did nothing further.
76
  No 
appeal was taken from the Alabama state postconviction proceedings, 
and the forty-two day period in which to appeal to the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals expired.  Mr. Maples’ federal constitutional challenges 
to his conviction and death sentence were defaulted.
77
  Cory Maples 
learned of his situation when the Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Alabama sent him a letter telling him that he had missed the 
deadline to appeal to the Alabama appeals court, and that he had only 
four weeks left in which to file his federal habeas petition.
78
 
Facing the Coleman conundrum that there can be no ineffective 
assistance of counsel if there is no federal right to counsel—and thus 
potentially no cause-and-prejudice to overcome a procedural default—
Mr. Maples was left to argue that his New York attorneys had 
 
 67.  Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 924 (2012) (“[U]nder agency principles, a client 
cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him. . . . We 
therefore inquire whether Maples has shown that his attorneys of record abandoned him, thereby 
supplying the ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond his control,’ necessary to lift the state procedural 
bar to his federal petition.”). 
 68.  Id. at 916. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. at 916-17. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 917. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. at 920. 
 78.  Id. 
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abandoned him and were no longer acting as his agents.  This was the 
claim that the Supreme Court considered in Maples. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg concluded that Mr. Maples’ 
lawyers had abandoned him, and that this constituted “cause” to excuse 
the procedural default.
79
  The Court reasoned that “under agency 
principles, a client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an 
attorney who has abandoned him.”
80
  The court continued: “Nor can a 
client be faulted for failing to act on his own behalf when he lacks 
reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact, are not representing 
him.”
81
  Specifically, the Court noted that the two New York attorneys 
had failed to file motions to withdraw in the Alabama court, and that 
they had left the firm before the default had occurred, accepting jobs 
with a federal judge and the European Commission that would have 
precluded them from continuing to represent Mr. Maples.
82
  Nor had 
local counsel been acting as Maples’ agent, the Court concluded, 
because he admitted that he had offered no substantive assistance in the 
case, a conception of his role that failed to comply with the Alabama 
rules.
83
  Because the New York attorneys had been listed as his counsel, 
however, Mr. Maples did not receive the notice himself.
84
  “[D]isarmed 
by extraordinary circumstances quite beyond his control,” the Court 
held, Maples “has shown ample cause . . . to excuse the procedural 
default into which he was trapped when counsel of record abandoned 
him without a word of warning.”
85
 
Maples represents an extreme fact situation.  However, it provides 
an “out” for state postconviction clients whose lawyers essentially cease 
to function as their representatives.  More broadly, it makes a statement 
regarding the Court’s willingness to find avenues for relief when states 
have failed to provide appointed counsel or other systems for reliable 
representation.
86
  Maples sends a message to the states that 
postconviction counsel have an important role to play in litigating 
federal constitutional claims in their courts. 
 
 79.  Id. at 924. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 926. 
 84.  Id. at 927. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  See Kovarsky, supra note 5 (pointing out that the Court’s 2010 decision in Holland v. 
Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549 (2010), which recognized equitable tolling for the one-year AEDPA statute 
of limitations, demonstrated the Robert Court’s willingness to provide court access to prisoners who 
received terrible postconviction representation.). 
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B.  Martinez v. Ryan 
While the Maples opinion indicated that prisoners in state 
postconviction might have some recourse for complete nonfeasance by 
counsel, Martinez provided a more systemic solution, addressing an 
issue left open in Coleman.  Coleman reserved the question of “whether 
a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which 
provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at 
trial.”
87
  The Martinez Court was careful to specify that it need not 
decide this question as a constitutional matter,
88
 but only “whether 
attorney errors in initial-review collateral proceedings may qualify as 
cause for a procedural default.”
89
 
In Mr. Martinez’s case, Arizona law precluded him from filing a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal—such claims 
could be brought for the first time only in state proceedings for collateral 
relief.
90
  Rather than raise such a claim, his lawyer in state 
postconviction proceedings filed a pleading claiming that she could find 
no colorable grounds for relief.
91
  Mr. Martinez disagreed, alleging 
numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in subsequent 
state collateral proceedings.
92
  Arizona courts declined to consider these 
claims because they were not raised in the first state postconviction 
proceeding.
93
  When Mr. Martinez sought federal habeas relief, the 
district court concluded that he was procedurally defaulted.
94
  Both the 
federal district court and the Ninth Circuit cited Coleman for the 
proposition that a state prisoner could not overcome procedural default 




By this logic, the Supreme Court in Martinez explained, “when an 
attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no 
state court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.”
96
  Moreover, the 
Court continued, “[t]his Court on direct review of the state proceeding 
 
 87.  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 755 (1991)). 
 88.  Id. at 1315. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 1314.  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 1314-15. 
 96.  Id. at 1316. 
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could not consider or adjudicate the claim.”
97
  As a result, the Martinez 
Court concluded, “no court will review the prisoner’s claim.”
98
 
To remedy this situation, the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision 
authored by Justice Kennedy, recognized two situations in which a state 
prisoner might overcome a procedural default in state postconviction 
proceedings that provide a first opportunity for review.
99
  If the state 
does not appoint effective postconviction counsel in an “initial-review 
collateral proceeding,” the prisoner will not be deemed to have defaulted 
the claim.
100
  Nor will procedural default bar federal review of a claim if 
appointed state postconviction counsel was ineffective.
101
 
The Court was careful to point out that its opinion did not recognize 
a free-standing constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in state 
postconviction proceedings.
102
  Rather, it established an equitable 
doctrine for overcoming procedural default under certain 
circumstances.
103
  The benefit of the equitable holding, the Court 
explained, was that it did not require the same system for provision of 
state postconviction counsel in each jurisdiction.
104
  Rather, a state could 
choose between appointing counsel in initial-review state collateral 




Martinez ensures that if a state fails to appoint counsel in initial-
review state postconviction proceedings, or appointed counsel is 
ineffective, a prisoner’s federal law claim will be heard on the merits in 
federal habeas.  In addition, Martinez places the choice before the states: 
provide adequate counsel in state postconviction and receive the benefit 
of restricted federal habeas review under AEDPA, or risk defending 
convictions on the merits in federal habeas.
106
  Martinez creates 





 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 1318. 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. at 1320. 
 102.  Id. at 1319. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 1320.  Professor Steven Vladeck has described this solution as “a new remedy, but 
no right.”  Steve Vladeck, Opinion Analysis: A New Remedy, But No Right, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21, 
2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/opinion-analysis-a-new-remedy-but-no-right/. 
 106.  Vladeck, supra note 105. 
 107.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s decision in Martinez would have 
even broader effect than the majority acknowledged.  He warned that “whoever advises the State 
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III. THE NEW STATE POSTCONVICTION 
I began this Symposium piece by quoting from the Court’s opinions 
in its 2007 decision in Lawrence v. Florida, acknowledging the new 
importance of certiorari grants from state postconviction proceedings.  
The same term as Maples and Martinez, in Greene v. Fisher,
108
 the Court 
pointed out once again the importance after AEDPA of pursuing federal 
law claims through state postconviction.
109
  In Greene, the defendant 
appealed his conviction in the Pennsylvania courts, alleging that it was 
error under Bruton v. United States
110
 to introduce his non-testifying co-
defendants’ confessions that had been redacted to remove proper names, 
but revealed obvious deletions.
111
  His conviction was affirmed by the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court and he filed a petition for allowance of 
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
112
  While that petition was 
pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gray v. Maryland,
113
 a 
decision that arguably would have entitled him to relief.
114
  Nonetheless, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed Greene’s petition as 
improvidently granted.
115
  The defendant then sought relief through 
federal habeas, ultimately litigating the case to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
116
  The Court denied relief, explaining that the Pennsylvania 
intermediate appellate court’s decision was not “contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law” at the time it 
was issued, because it preceded the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gray by 
three months.
117
  Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia pointed out that 
the defendant had “missed two opportunities to obtain relief under 
Gray”—he could have filed a petition for certiorari from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision denying his petition, or he could 
have sought state postconviction relief.
118
  He did neither, instead 
pursuing federal habeas, and so, because of his choice of vehicle, his 
 
would himself be guilty of ineffective assistance if he did not counsel the appointment of state-
collateral-review counsel in all cases—lest the failure to raise that claim in the state proceedings be 
excused and the State be propelled into federal habeas . . . .”  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1322 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 108.  132 S. Ct. 38 (2011). 
 109.  Id. at 45. 
 110.  391 U.S. 123 (1968).  
 111.  Fisher, 132 S. Ct. at 42. 
 112.  Id. at 43. 
 113.  523 U.S. 185 (1998). 
 114.  Fisher, 132 S. Ct. at 43. 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. at 45. 
 118.  Id.  
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claim failed. 
Other developments in state postconviction reinforce its potential 
for comparative advantage as a vehicle for relief.  For example, the 
Court recognized in Danforth v. Minnesota
119
 that the anti-retroactivity 
doctrine of Teague v. Lane
120
 does not apply to state postconviction as a 
matter of federal constitutional law.  States may adopt Teague, but they 
are not required to do so, because the comity and federalism rationales 
present in federal habeas do not apply to state postconviction.
121
  In other 
words, states can choose to give more litigants the benefit of new 
constitutional rules that do not apply in federal habeas courts.
122
 
In addition to being a relatively advantageous path to relief for 
individual litigants, state postconviction cases are now the prime vehicle 
in which the Supreme Court can develop certain areas of federal 
constitutional law.  This is particularly true of ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrine in the types of criminal cases generally prosecuted in 
state court.  The blockbuster case Padilla v. Kentucky,
123
 in which the 
Court concluded that it was ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to 
advise a client regarding the clear deportation consequence of a guilty 
plea, was a certiorari grant from state postconviction.
124
 In another set of 
decisions from the October 2011 Term, this pair considering ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims with respect to lapsed or rejected plea 
offers,
125
 the Court granted certiorari in one state postconviction case, 
Missouri v. Frye,
126




 119.  552 U.S. 264, 275-82 (2008). 
 120.  489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
 121.  Danforth, 552 U.S. at 278-79.  Regrettably, some states have chosen not to exercise their 
authority in this area.  See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 761 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 2009).  See also 
Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability” after Danforth v. 
Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 33 (2009). 
 122.  See, e.g., Lasch, supra note 121, at 55 (describing how Missouri and Indiana chose to 
apply the Sixth Amendment capital sentencing rule of Ring v. Arizona retroactively in state 
postconviction proceedings, while Florida and Idaho did not). 
 123.  130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 124.  Id.  See also King, supra note 26 (pointing out that Padilla was a cert grant from state 
postconviction and discussing how that procedural posture differed from a cert grant from federal 
habeas subject to AEDPA).  But see Chaidez v. United States,  ___ S. Ct. ___, 2013 WL 610201 
(2012) (concluding in the context of a federal prisoner’s coram nobis petition that Padilla does not 
apply retroactively to prisoners whose convictions were final when the case was decided).  Cf. 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008) (concluding that state courts are not constrained by 
federal anti-retroactivity analysis). 
 125.  See Cara H. Drinan, Lafler and Frye: Good News for Public Defense Litigation, 25 FED. 
SENT. REPT. 138 (Dec. 2012). 
 126.  132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012). 
 127.  132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383, 1390 (2012) (concluding that the state court decision in that case 
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perhaps to permit itself maximum flexibility.  The dissent in Lafler did 




In another decision, Jackson v. Hobbs, one of the two cases in 
which the Court invalidated mandatory life without parole (LWOP) 
sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses, certiorari was 
granted from a state postconviction case.
129
  Its companion case, Miller 




Maples and Martinez create powerful incentives for the 
appointment of effective counsel in state postconviction proceedings.
131
  
In a context in which these cases are an increasingly important forum for 
litigating federal constitutional claims, and possibly the sole vehicle for 
presenting certain kinds of new claims to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
measures that improve the quality of counsel in state postconviction 
proceedings might produce important effects.  In its October 2011 term, 
the Supreme Court has set the stage for a new state postconviction.  
Whether state postconviction realizes its potential depends in large part 
on the resources made available at the state level, and on the initiative of 
the local defense bars. 
 
 
merited relief under AEDPA because it was “contrary to clearly established federal law.”). 
 128.  Id. at 1395-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the claim does not merit relief under 
AEDPA).  But see King, supra, note 26, at 32 (discussing the implications of Lafler for review 
under AEDPA and for its potential application in state prisoners’ federal habeas cases). 
 129.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012). 
 130.  Id. at 2463. 
 131.  But see King, Preview, supra note 5, at 15 (arguing that states might still prefer to take 
their chances in federal habeas: “given the ease with which such claims can be defeated in most 
cases, and the chances that a petitioner will be released before even reaching federal court, a state 
may conclude that waiving the default defense and defending the merits of those defaulted 
ineffectiveness claims that actually reach a federal court is cheaper than providing counsel or 
evidentiary hearing for more post-conviction petitioners . . . .”). 
